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Abstract 
 
A theoretical framework is constructed to derive general conditions under which increased buyer 
power weakens or strengthens a supplier’s incentive to innovate. These conditions are then 
applied to two sets of specific models: one on product innovation and the other on process 
innovation.  The analysis shows that the effects of buyer power depend on the type of innovation, 
the source of buyer power, and the channel through which buyer power manifests itself.  It 
identifies circumstances under which an increase in buyer power has a negative, positive or zero 
impact on innovation.  The welfare consequences of buyer power are also investigated.   
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1. Introduction 
The rise of large, powerful retail organizations such as Wal-Mart, Home Depot and Staples has 
enhanced the interest among academics and practitioners of competition policy in the effects of 
buyer power, as the success of these retailers has been partially attributed to their ability to 
exercise buyer power against their suppliers (see, for example, Vance and Scott 1994).  While 
some commentators have argued that retailer buyer power benefits consumers, others have 
expressed concerns over the longer term impact of such power on the suppliers’ incentives to 
innovate.  In particular, a frequently raised concern is the possibility that the squeeze on 
suppliers’ profit margins by large retailers may lead to reduced product choices for consumers or 
weakened incentives to reduce costs (see, for example, Dobson and Waterson 1999, European 
Commission 1999, OECD 1999, FTC 2001, OECD 2008).  Given the critical role of innovation 
in modern-day economies, it is then important to understand how innovation would be affected 
by the rise of powerful buyers.  
The objective of this paper is to analyze a supplier’s incentive to innovate by examining a 
general model as well as a series of specific models of buyer power in the context of product and 
process innovation.   Using the general model, I derive a set of conditions under which increased 
buyer power strengthens or weakens the supplier’s incentive to innovate.  These general 
conditions are then elaborated upon through the analysis of the specific models.   In addition to 
the impact on innovation, the analysis also sheds light on the effects of buyer power on consumer 
welfare and social welfare.   In so doing, I strive to construct a general theory that encompasses 
different types of innovations, different sources of buyer power and different channels through 
which buyer power manifests itself.  
  
3 
To be more specific, I consider a situation where a manufacturer produces and supplies a set 
of products to retailers in a number of geographic markets, with each market being served by one 
large retailer and possibly a number of fringe retailers.  The terms of trade between the supplier 
and each large retailer are negotiated, but the supplier’s investment in innovation is not 
contractible.  Using the generalized Nash bargaining solution, I study retailer buyer power that 
manifests itself through three channels: the retailer’s bargaining power, the retailer’s bargaining 
position, and the supplier’s bargaining position.   After examining of these three manifestations 
of buyer power in the general model, I study each of them in more detail in specific models 
where buyer power comes from each of the following two sources: a reduction in the number of 
fringe retailers in a geographic market and an increase in the size of a chain store that serves 
multiple geographic markets.  The former confers more buyer power to the large retailer in that 
geographic market as it weakens the supplier’s bargaining position.   The latter enhances the 
chain store’s profitability of producing its own brand of differentiated products (backward 
integration) in the event of a disagreement with the supplier, and thus improves the retailer’s 
bargaining position.  Moreover, I develop a theory to demonstrate that a reduction in the number 
of fringe retailers or an increase in the size of the chain store can strengthen the retailer’s relative 
bargaining power because it induces the retailer to boost its spending on the quality of its 
negotiation team.1  Therefore, this analysis covers a wide range of scenarios where buyer power 
comes from two different sources and manifests itself through three different channels.   
As alluded to earlier, I examine two sets of specific models, one for product innovation and 
the other for process innovation.  In the former, the supplier’s incentive to invest is measured by 
                                                 
1 Depending on the source of the increased buyer power, the supplier’s spending on the quality of its 
negotiation team either falls or rises.  But even in the latter case, the increase in spending by the retailer is 
larger than that by the supplier, thus enhancing the retailer’s relative bargaining power. 
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the number of differentiated products it produces.  In the latter, it is measured by the level of 
investment in R&D that reduces the marginal cost of production.  Both types of innovations are 
modelled in the context of the Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) framework of production differentiation, 
which enables an examination of the welfare consequences of increased buyer power.   
The analysis of the general model highlights a simple but useful principle, that is, the impact 
of increased buyer power on the incentive to innovate depends on its marginal effect on the 
supplier’s marginal – as opposed to the total – gains from the investment.  While intuitively one 
might expect that the change in the marginal gains should normally go in the same direction as 
the change in the total gains, the analysis of the specific models identifies circumstances under 
which this intuition does or does not hold.  As summarized in Table 1, the impact of buyer power 
on the supplier’s incentive to innovate depends on the type of innovation and the channel 
through which the buyer power manifests itself.  For example, an increase in a retailer’s buyer 
power through the retailer’s improved bargaining position has a negative impact on the 
supplier’s incentive to engage in product innovation, but it has no impact on process innovation.  
On the other hand, an increase in buyer power that manifests itself through a weakened 
bargaining position of the supplier can strengthen the supplier’s incentive to engage in product 
innovation under a certain demand condition.  The analysis of these specific models reveals a 
number of different mechanisms through which buyer power affects supplier innovation.   
The preceding discussion implies that the impact of increased buyer power on consumer and 
social welfare will also depend on the type of innovation, the source of buyer power, and the 
channel through which the buyer power manifests itself.   Indeed, the increased buyer power 
reduces consumer welfare and social welfare in situations where it weakens the incentives to 
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innovate.  On the other hand, increased buyer power that strengthens the incentives to innovate 
benefits the consumers but may have an ambiguous impact on social welfare.    
In the literature, numerous authors have studied the short-run effects of buyer power on 
prices.  For example, von Ungern-Sternberg (1996) and Dobson and Waterson (1997) 
demonstrate that increased concentration in a retailer market does not necessarily lead to lower 
prices for consumers; under certain conditions it in fact results in higher prices.  Chen (2003), on 
the other hand, shows that increased buyer power in the hands of a dominant retailer reduces 
prices for consumers, but it does not necessarily improve welfare.    
By examining the long-term effect of buyer power on suppliers’ incentives to innovate, the 
present paper follows Inderst and Wey (2007 and 2011).2  In particular, Inderst and Wey (2011) 
demonstrate that buyer power may induce a supplier to increase its investment in process 
innovation.  In their model, the source of buyer power is its size; an increase in the size of a 
retailer improves the attractiveness of backward integration by the retailer.  While the main 
contribution of the other article by Inderst and Wey (2007) is the identification of two sources of 
buyer power in situations where a supplier faces strictly convex costs or capacity constraints, it 
also examines the supplier’s choice between two alternative production technologies and, 
respectively, two alternative products.    
Relative to the works by Inderst and Wey, I present a more general theory that encompasses 
different sources of buyer power and different types of innovations.  In addition to backward 
integration, I also study the buyer power arising from a reduction in the number of competing 
retailers in a market and from a retailer’s endogenous spending on the quality of its negotiation 
                                                 
2 Also of relevance are Battigalli et al. (2007) and Montez (2007) that study the impact of downstream 
market power on upstream incentives to invest in, respectively, quality improvement and production 
capacity.   
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team.  To the best of my knowledge, the link between spending on the quality of its negotiation 
team and the retailer’s bargaining power has never been articulated and examined in the 
literature.  Furthermore, I conduct a detailed analysis of product innovation based on the Dixit-
Stiglitz framework.   The rich structure of these models enables a comprehensive analysis of 
buyer power.    
The paper is organized as follows.  In section 2, I present a general framework of supplier 
innovation in the presence of buyer power and use it to derive a number of general conditions 
under which an increase in buyer power weakens or strengthens the supplier’s incentive to 
innovate.  In sections 3 and 4, I examine specific models of product innovation and process 
innovation, respectively.  In section 5, I extend the models in section 3 to incorporate 
endogenous bargaining power and demonstrate that an increase in the size of a large retailer 
induces the retailer to increase its spending on the quality of its negotiation team, thus enhancing 
the retailer’s relative bargaining power.  Conclusions are in section 6.  
2. A General Theory 
Consider a situation where a manufacturer produces and supplies n products to retailers in m 
geographic markets.  The demand functions for these products are identical across the m markets.  
Each market is served by one large retailer and possibly a number of fringe retailers.  The fringe 
retailers are price-takers both in the retail markets and in their dealing with the manufacturer.  
Accordingly, the retail prices in a geographic market are set by the large retailer serving that 
market.  A large retailer may operate a chain that serves multiple markets.  Taking into account 
this possibility, let l (≤ m) be the number of large retailers and j the index of a large retailer.      
The manufacturer/supplier and each large retailer play the following two-stage game.  In 
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stage 1 the supplier chooses the level of investment in innovation, which influences either its 
revenue (product innovation) or its costs of production (process innovation) in some way.  In 
stage 2 the supplier negotiates with each large retailer over the terms under which the products 
are sold to the latter.  In the case where fringe retailers are present, the supplier makes a take-it-
or-leave-it offer to these retailers.  The game ends with each large retailer and (if applicable) the 
fringe retailers resell the products to final consumers.  The supplier’s investment in innovations 
is a sunk cost and hence is not recoverable in stage 2.3    
The production technology of the supplier exhibits constant returns to scale.  This implies 
that the negotiation between the supplier and the large retailer in a market is independent of what 
happens in the other markets.  The negotiation game itself is modelled as the generalized Nash 
bargaining solution (Harsanyi and Selton 1972).  Consistent with this, we assume that the terms 
of contract between the supplier and the large retailer are non-linear so that it maximizes the joint 
surplus that the two parties earn from the sales in the retailer’s market(s). 4  Moreover, the use of 
non-linear contracts also enables the supplier to extract all the profits from the fringe retailers (if 
there are any).   
Let Π𝑗  denote the maximum joint surplus of the supplier and large retailer j, and 𝜋𝑀
𝑗  the 
surplus earned by the supplier from the sales through retailer j (j = 1, 2, ..., or, l) and  (if 
                                                 
3 Therefore, at the core of this model is the familiar investment holdup problem.  While the literature on 
this topic has focused mostly on ways to deal with the under-investment caused by the holdup problem 
(Che and Sákovics 2004), the present paper examines how the investment level is affected by the market 
power of the buyer and shows that buyer power may stimulate investment under some circumstances.    
4 In practice, contracts between manufacturers and retailers are complex and highly non-linear (Inderst 
and Wey 2004 p6).  Theoretically, it is easy to design a two-part tariff that enables the supplier and the 
retailer to achieve joint-surplus maximization.   In Chen (2004), for example, the contract between the 
supplier and the retailer consists of a wholesale price and a lump sum fee while the retailer is free to 
choose the retail price.  It is shown that joint-surplus maximization is achieved by setting the wholesale 
price equal to the marginal cost of production.  
  
8 
applicable) the fringe retailers in the same market(s).  Then the surplus earned by retailer j is 
Π𝑗 − 𝜋𝑀
𝑗 .   The disagreement payoffs are denoted by 𝜋𝑀
𝑗𝑑 for the supplier and 𝜋𝑅
𝑗𝑑  for the retailer.  
To make the bargaining problem meaningful, assume that Π𝑗 > 𝜋𝑅𝑗𝑑 + 𝜋𝑀𝑗𝑑, which ensures that 
there are gains from reaching an agreement.  Since the supplier’s investment cost is sunk, Π𝑗 , 𝜋𝑀
𝑗  
and 𝜋𝑀
𝑗𝑑 are quasi-rents without deducting the investment cost.     
The generalized Nash bargaining problem between the supplier and retailer j can be written 
as: 
max
𝜋𝑀
𝑗 �Π𝑗 − 𝜋𝑀
𝑗 − 𝜋𝑅
𝑗𝑑�
𝛾𝑗(𝜋𝑀𝑗 − 𝜋𝑀𝑗𝑑)1−𝛾𝑗 ,                  (1) 
where parameter 𝛾𝑗 ∈ (0,1) determines retailer j’s share of the net gains from the agreement.  
Following the terminology of Dukes et al. (2006), I will refer to 𝛾𝑗 as retailer j’s (relative) 
bargaining power, 𝜋𝑅
𝑗𝑑 retailer j’s bargaining position, and  𝜋𝑀
𝑗𝑑  the supplier’s bargaining 
position.  
It is straightforward to solve (1) to obtain the supplier’s payoff from the sales in the market(s) 
of retailer j:   
𝜋𝑀
𝑗 = �1 − 𝛾𝑗�Π𝑗 + 𝛾𝑗𝜋𝑀𝑗𝑑 − �1 − 𝛾𝑗�𝜋𝑅𝑗𝑑,    (2) 
and retailer j’s payoff:   
𝜋𝑅
𝑗 = 𝛾𝑗Π𝑗 + �1 − 𝛾𝑗�𝜋𝑅𝑗𝑑 − 𝛾𝑗𝜋𝑀𝑗𝑑 .              (3) 
From (2) and (3) we can see that an improvement in the supplier’s bargaining position (i.e., a 
larger 𝜋𝑀
𝑗𝑑) raises its own payoff and lowers the retailer’s payoff, while an improvement in the 
retailer’s bargaining position (i.e., a larger 𝜋𝑅
𝑗𝑑) does the opposite.   Furthermore, it can be shown 
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that an increase in the retailer’s relative bargaining power (i.e., a larger γj) benefits the retailer 
but hurts the supplier.  
Let 𝛽𝑗 denote retailer j’s buyer power.5  It can manifest itself through three channels.  First, it 
can manifest itself through the retailer’s relative bargaining power, in which case we expect 
𝜕𝛾𝑗 𝜕𝛽𝑗⁄ > 0.  Second, it can have an impact on the retailer’s bargaining position.  Third,  it can 
weaken the supplier’s bargaining position.  In the latter two cases, 𝛽𝑗 influences the value of 𝜋𝑅
𝑗𝑑 
or 𝜋𝑀
𝑗𝑑.  Specifically, we expect that ∂𝜋𝑅
𝑗𝑑 ∂𝛽𝑗 > 0�  and ∂𝜋𝑀𝑗𝑑 ∂𝛽𝑗 < 0� .  In other words, to the 
extent that buyer power affects the disagreement payoffs, it strengthens the retailer’s bargaining 
position and/or weakens that of the supplier.  
Let 𝑘 denote the amount of investment on innovation made by the supplier and 𝑓 the cost per 
unit of investment.  The joint surplus Π𝑗  is a function of 𝑘 because of the latter’s impact on the 
revenues or costs.  For the supplier to undertake any investment at all, the marginal benefit of the 
investment has to be positive.  Accordingly, I assume that ∂Π𝑗 ∂𝑘 > 0⁄ .  On the other hand, the 
disagreement payoffs, 𝜋𝑅
𝑗𝑑  and 𝜋𝑀
𝑗𝑑 , may or may not be dependent on 𝑘.  In the case of process 
innovation, for example, it is reasonable to expect that a cost reduction brought about by 
investment k will have an impact on 𝜋𝑀
𝑗𝑑  but not on 𝜋𝑅
𝑗𝑑 .   Thus, I do not make any assumption 
regarding the signs of ∂𝜋𝑀
𝑗𝑑 ∂𝑘⁄  and ∂𝜋𝑅
𝑗𝑑 ∂𝑘⁄  in the general model.6  
The objective here is to examine the impact of an increase in 𝛽𝑗 on the equilibrium value of 
k.  The supplier chooses the value of 𝑘 in stage 1 by maximizing its profits from all l retailers and 
                                                 
5 To maintain the generality of this analysis, the source of buyer power is not specified here.  In sections 
3-5, I will study the buyer power that stems from specific sources. 
6 In the specific models studied in sections 3 and 4, the signs of these derivatives are determined 
endogenously.  
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(if applicable) all fringe retailers:  max 𝑘 π𝑀 = ∑ 𝜋𝑀𝑗 − 𝑘𝑓𝑙𝑗=1 = ∑ ��1 − 𝛾𝑗�Π𝑗 + 𝛾𝑗𝜋𝑀𝑗𝑑 − �1 − 𝛾𝑗�𝜋𝑅𝑗𝑑�𝑙𝑗=1 − 𝑘𝑓,  (4) 
with the resulting first-order condition: 
𝜕π𝑀
𝜕𝑘
= � ��1 − 𝛾𝑗� 𝜕Π𝑗
𝜕𝑘
+ 𝛾𝑗 𝜕𝜋𝑀𝑗𝑑
𝜕𝑘
− �1 − 𝛾𝑗� 𝜕𝜋𝑅𝑗𝑑
𝜕𝑘
�
𝑙
𝑗=1
− 𝑓 = 0.             (5) 
Assume that the second-order condition for a maximum, ∂2π𝑀 ∂𝑘2 < 0⁄ , is satisfied.  
Intuitively, one might expect that the impact of buyer power on the supplier’s investment in 
innovation should depend on how the latter’s profits are affected, i.e., on the sign of 𝜕π𝑀/𝜕𝛽𝑗.  
If the buyer power improves (respectively, reduces) the supplier’s profits, it should strengthen 
(respectively, weaken) its incentive to innovate.  Indeed, the common concerns over the impact 
of buyer power on supplier innovation appear to be motivated by the expectation that buyer 
power would lead to decreased profitability of suppliers (see, for example, OECD 1999 and 
Dobson and Chakraborty 2008).  
Using this general theoretical framework, I am able to add more rigor to the above intuition.  
Totally differentiating (5), I obtain:   
𝜕𝑘
𝜕𝛽𝑗
= −∂2π𝑀 ∂𝛽𝑗 ∂𝑘⁄
∂2π𝑀 ∂𝑘2⁄
.              (6) 
Since ∂2π𝑀 ∂𝑘2⁄ < 0, the sign of (6) depends on that of ∂2π𝑀 ∂𝛽𝑗 ∂𝑘⁄ .  Thus, (6) suggests a 
simple but useful principle.  That is, the impact of buyer power on the investment in innovation 
depends on how buyer power (𝛽𝑗) affects the supplier’s marginal gains from the investment 
(𝜕𝜋𝑀 𝜕𝑘⁄ ).  To be more specific, buyer power weakens the supplier’s incentives to innovate if 
and only if it reduces the marginal gains from the innovation.  This suggests that even though 
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buyer power may lower the supplier’s profits in many situations, this by itself does not mean that 
the supplier has a smaller incentive to invest in innovation.   While this point is elementary to an 
economist, it is not always recognized or made clear in the policy discussions of buyer power.   
More can be said about condition (6) for each of the three manifestations of buyer power.  In 
the case where buyer power manifests itself through retailer j’s bargaining power (i.e., 
𝜕𝛾𝑗 𝜕𝛽𝑗⁄ > 0):  
𝜕𝑘
𝜕𝛽𝑗
= − �∂2π𝑀 ∂𝛾𝑗 ∂𝑘⁄
∂2π𝑀 ∂𝑘2⁄
�
𝜕𝛾𝑗
𝜕𝛽𝑗
= 𝜕𝛾𝑗 𝜕𝛽𝑗⁄
∂2π𝑀 ∂𝑘2⁄
�
𝜕Π𝑗
𝜕𝑘
−
𝜕𝜋𝑀
𝑗𝑑
𝜕𝑘
−
𝜕𝜋𝑅
𝑗𝑑
𝜕𝑘
�  .            (7) 
Equation (7) implies that an increase in retailer j’s relative bargaining power reduces the 
supplier’s investment in innovation if and only if the marginal increase in joint surplus from the 
investment is sufficiently large that 𝜕Π𝑗 𝜕𝑘⁄ > 𝜕𝜋𝑀𝑗𝑑 𝜕𝑘⁄ + 𝜕𝜋𝑅𝑗𝑑 𝜕𝑘⁄ .  For example, if their 
bargaining positions are independent of the investment (i.e., if 𝜕𝜋𝑀𝑗𝑑 𝜕𝑘⁄ = 𝜕𝜋𝑅𝑗𝑑 𝜕𝑘⁄ = 0), 
increased retailer bargaining power unambiguously reduces the investment in innovation.  On the 
other hand, if the investment affects the disagreement payoffs in such a way that 𝜕𝜋𝑀
𝑗𝑑 𝜕𝑘⁄ +
𝜕𝜋𝑅
𝑗𝑑 𝜕𝑘⁄ > 𝜕Π𝑗 𝜕𝑘⁄ , the increase in retailer bargaining power strengthens the supplier’s 
incentives to innovate.   This latter case is particularly worth noting because 1 − 𝛾𝑗 determines 
the supplier’s share of net gains from the negotiation with retailer j, and one might have thought 
that an increase in 𝛾𝑗 should reduce both the total and the marginal gains from the investment in 
innovation.  
In the case where buyer power strengthens a retailer’s bargaining position (i.e., 
∂𝜋𝑅
𝑗𝑑 ∂𝛽𝑗 > 0� ), 
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𝜕𝑘
𝜕𝛽𝑗
= −∂2π𝑀 ∂𝛽𝑗 ∂𝑘⁄
∂2π𝑀 ∂𝑘2⁄
= �1 − 𝛾𝑗� ∂2𝜋𝑅𝑗𝑑 ∂𝛽𝑗 ∂𝑘�
∂2π𝑀 ∂𝑘2⁄
.                 (8) 
Equation (8) suggests that an increase in retailer j’s buyer power reduces the investment in 
innovation if and only if ∂2𝜋𝑅
𝑗𝑑 ∂𝛽𝑗 ∂𝑘� > 0, i.e., if and only if the buyer power enhances the 
marginal impact of the investment on the retailer’s bargaining position.  Similarly, if the buyer 
power weakens the supplier’s bargaining position (i.e., ∂𝜋𝑀
𝑗𝑑 ∂𝛽𝑗 < 0� ),  
𝜕𝑘
𝜕𝛽𝑗
= −∂2π𝑀 ∂𝛽𝑗 ∂𝑘⁄
∂2π𝑀 ∂𝑘2⁄
= −𝛾𝑗 ∂2𝜋𝑀𝑗𝑑 ∂𝛽𝑗 ∂𝑘�
∂2π𝑀 ∂𝑘2⁄
 .             (9) 
Equation (9) implies that an increase in retailer j’s buyer power reduces the investment in 
innovation if and only if ∂2𝜋𝑀
𝑗𝑑 ∂𝛽𝑗 ∂𝑘� < 0.  Since ∂𝜋𝑀𝑗𝑑 ∂𝛽𝑗 < 0� , a negative sign of 
∂2𝜋𝑀
𝑗𝑑 ∂𝛽𝑗 ∂𝑘�  means that the buyer power magnifies the marginal impact of investment on the 
supplier’s bargaining position (by making ∂𝜋𝑀
𝑗𝑑 ∂𝛽𝑗�  more negative). 
The preceding analysis begs the question: Can buyer power actually have such effects on the 
supplier’s marginal gains of investment as contemplated above?  Intuitively it seems likely that if 
buyer power reduces the supplier’s gains from the investment, it will reduce its marginal gains as 
well.  Are there plausible circumstances under which buyer power reduces the supplier’s total 
gains yet raises its marginal gains from the investment in innovation? 
To answer these questions, I will examine, in the next two sections, the three manifestations 
of buyer power in specific models of product innovation and process innovation.   To highlight 
the link between these specific models and the general framework in this section, I present, in 
Table 2, a summary of the results from the analysis of the specific models.  From the table it can 
be seen that an increase in buyer power can have a positive, negative, no effect on the supplier’s 
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marginal gains from innovation.   
3. Product Innovation 
In this section, I construct a set of more elaborate models of buyer power for the case of product 
innovation.   To be more specific, I consider a situation where the supplier manufactures n 
differentiated products and treat n as a measure of product innovation.  Intuitively, it seems 
reasonable to postulate that more investment in product innovation would enable the supplier to 
launch more products into the market, and hence, a stronger incentive to engage in product 
innovation would lead to a larger n.  Relating to the general framework in section 2, I have 
𝑘 = 𝑛 in this section.   
3.1 Consumer Preferences and Welfare Measures 
The preferences of a representative consumer in each market are represented by the Dixit-Stiglitz 
(1977) utility function 𝑢 = 𝑈�𝑥0, {∑ 𝑥𝑖𝜌𝑛𝑖=1 }1/𝜌�, where 𝑥0 is the quantity of a numeraire good, 𝑥𝑖 
(i = 1, 2. ... n) is the quantity of differentiated product i, and 𝜌 < 1.  Let y denote the second 
argument in U.  The utility function U is homothetic and concave in 𝑥0 and 𝑦.  Let 𝑝𝑖 be the 
price of differentiated product i, and I be the representative consumer’s income.  The price of the 
numeraire good is normalized to be 1.  Then the consumer’s budget constraint is: 𝑥0 +
∑ 𝑝𝑖𝑥𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 = 𝐼.   The first-order condition of the consumer’s utility maximization problem is: 
𝑝𝑖
𝜕𝑈
𝜕𝑥0
= 𝑥𝑖𝜌−1 𝜕𝑈𝜕𝑦 �� 𝑥𝑗𝜌𝑛𝑗=1 �1 𝜌⁄ −1 , (𝑖 =  1, 2. . . .𝑛).               (10) 
It has been derived by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977 p299) that when all differentiated products are 
sold at the same price p, the demand for product i solved from (10) can be written in the form 
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𝑥𝑖 = 𝑥(𝑝, 𝑛) = 𝐼𝑠(𝑞)𝑝𝑛 ,                                    (11) 
where 𝑠(𝑞) is a function that depends on the form of U, and q is a price index defined by 
𝑞 = �∑ 𝑝𝑖−𝜌/(1−𝜌)𝑛𝑖=1 �−(1−𝜌)/𝜌 = 𝑝𝑛−(1−𝜌)/𝜌.  Since all of the n products are symmetric in the 
utility function, in equilibrium the supplier and retailers will treat them symmetrically.  I will 
thus drop the subscript i in 𝑥𝑖 and 𝑝𝑖.    
Substituting (11) and the consumer’s budget constraint into the utility function, I obtain a 
measure of consumer welfare:  
𝑉(𝑝, 𝐼,𝑛) = 𝑈�𝐼 − 𝑛𝑝𝑥(𝑝,𝑛),𝑛1 𝜌⁄ 𝑥(𝑝, 𝑛)�.              (12) 
Using the envelope theorem, I can easily show that 𝜕𝑉 𝜕𝑝 < 0⁄  and 𝜕𝑉 𝜕𝐼 > 0⁄ .  Moreover, 
𝜕𝑉
𝜕𝑛
= 𝑝𝑥(1 − 𝜌)
𝜌
�
𝜕𝑈
𝜕𝑥0
� > 0.                           (13) 
That is, consumers benefit from the supplier’s investment in product innovation, ceteris paribus.  
Assuming that profits are distributed evenly to the representative consumers in the m 
markets, I rewrite (12) to obtain a social welfare function: 
𝑊(𝑝,𝑛) = 𝑉 �𝑝, 𝐼0 + Π𝑇𝑚 ,𝑛� = 𝑈 �𝐼0 + Π𝑇𝑚 − 𝑛𝑝𝑥(𝑝,𝑛),𝑛1 𝜌⁄ 𝑥(𝑝,𝑛)� ,       (14) 
where Π𝑇 is the joint profits of all firms and 𝐼0 is the consumer’s income from other sources.  In 
(14), Π𝑇 is divided by m because U is the utility of the representative consumer in one of the m 
markets.   
Let θ(q) be the elasticity of the function 𝑠(𝑞), i.e., −𝑞𝑠′(𝑞) 𝑠(𝑞)⁄ .  It is straightforward to 
show that the price elasticity of demand implied by (11), where all differentiated products are 
sold at the same price p, is equal to (1 + θ).  Following Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), I assume  
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𝜃(𝑞) < 𝜌1 − 𝜌                          (15) 
to ensure that the Chamberlinian dd curve is more elastic than the DD curve.7  Conditions (11) 
and (15) imply that  
𝜕𝑥(𝑝,𝑛)
𝜕𝑛
= − 𝐼𝑠[𝜃(1 − 𝜌) 𝜌⁄ − 1]
𝑛2𝑝
< 0,                  (16) 
i.e., the demand for each product is smaller when the number of products increases.   
On the production side, each differentiated product is manufactured at constant marginal cost 
𝑐𝑀.  Since this section is not concerned with process innovation, 𝑐𝑀 is normalized to zero.  
Consistent with the notations in the general framework in section 2, let 𝑓 denote the R&D costs 
of developing a product.  Then the total costs of developing and producing n products are 𝑛𝑓.  
The retail cost of selling a unit of any product is c.   
With the use of non-linear contracts, the supplier and the retailers are able to maximize their 
joint quasi-rents from the sales of the n products.  This implies the maximization of the quasi-
rents in each retail market because the demand (and cost) in different markets is independent of 
each other.  Thus, the retail price in market h (=1, 2.., m), 𝑝ℎ, solves  
Πℎ∗ = max𝑝ℎ  (𝑝ℎ − 𝑐) �𝐼𝑠(𝑞ℎ)𝑝ℎ𝑛 � 𝑛.                    (17) 
The first-order condition for an interior solution implies the following standard monopoly pricing 
rule (with 1 + 𝜃 being the elasticity of demand):  
𝑝ℎ − 𝑐
𝑝ℎ
= 11 − 𝑞ℎ𝑠′(𝑞ℎ)/𝑠(𝑞ℎ) = 11 + 𝜃(𝑞ℎ).                          (18) 
                                                 
7 The dd curve is the demand curve for a product holding the prices of other products constant, while the 
DD curve is the demand curve for the product when the prices of all products change simultaneously 
(Chamberlin 1933). 
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In order to ensure that the first-order condition (18) and the second-order condition for this 
optimization problem are satisfied, assume that 𝜃(𝑞) > 0 and 𝜃′(𝑞) > 0, or equivalently, 𝑠′ < 0 
and 𝑠′′ < 0.   
Let 𝑝ℎ(𝑛) be the solution to (18).  Comparative statics reveals that  
𝜕𝑝ℎ
𝜕𝑛
= 𝑝ℎ𝑐𝜃′[(1 − 𝜌)/𝜌]𝑞ℎ
𝑛𝑝ℎ𝜃2 + 𝑛𝑐𝜃′𝑞ℎ > 0,                       (19) 
which means that the equilibrium retail price rises with the number of products.  Since consumer 
preferences are the same across the m markets, 𝑝ℎ(𝑛) and 𝑞ℎ = 𝑝(𝑛)𝑛−(1−𝜌) 𝜌⁄  are the same in 
all markets.  From now on, I drop the superscript h on p and q.   Accordingly, I rewrite (17) as:  
Π∗ = [𝑝(𝑛) − 𝑐] �𝐼𝑠(𝑞(𝑛))
𝑝(𝑛) � .                   (20) 
It is easy to verify that 
𝜕Π∗
𝜕𝑛
= − (𝑝 − 𝑐)(1 − 𝜌)𝐼𝑠′
𝜌𝑛1 𝜌⁄
> 0,               (21) 
which says that an increase in the number of products raises the joint quasi-rents in each market.   
Using p(n), I can write the consumer welfare in (12) in the form 𝑉(𝑝(𝑛), 𝐼,𝑛).  Then using 
(12), (13), and (19), I find the effect of a change in n on consumer welfare:  
𝑑𝑉(𝑝(𝑛), 𝐼,𝑛)
𝑑𝑛
= 𝜕𝑉
𝜕𝑝
𝑝′(𝑛) + 𝜕𝑉
𝜕𝑛
= 𝑥(1 − 𝜌)𝜃2
𝜌[𝑝𝜃2 + (𝑐 + 𝑤)𝑞𝜃′] 𝜕𝑈𝜕𝑥0 > 0.      (22) 
That is, after taking into consideration of the rise in retail prices, consumer welfare still increases 
with the number of products.   
In the remainder of section 3, I will study three specific models based on the framework 
developed above.  In these models, retailer buyer power manifests itself through three different 
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channels, namely, the supplier’s bargaining position, the retailer’s relative bargaining power, and 
the retailer’s bargaining position.   
3.2. Supplier’s Bargaining Position and Product Innovation 
In the first specific model, a retailer’s buyer power manifests itself through the supplier’s 
bargaining position.  Specifically, consider a situation where the success of a large retailer 
reduces the number of competing retailers in a geographic market, thus decreasing the number of 
retail channels available to the supplier.  This, in turn, weakens the supplier’s bargaining position 
in this market.  
Specifically, I assume that each geographic market j is served by 𝜇𝑗 + 1 retailers: one large 
retailer and 𝜇𝑗 fringe retailers.  The large retailer possesses market power, but the fringe retailers 
do not.  In other words, a fringe retailer is a price-taker both in its dealing with the supplier and 
in its operation in the retail market.  To simplify presentation, suppose that each retailer sells in 
one market only; thus, 𝑙 = 𝑚.   
The fringe retailers in each market are reliable retail channels for the supplier in the sense 
that products are sold through these retailers independent of whether the supplier reaches an 
agreement with the large retailer in this market.  In particular, the supplier would sell exclusively 
through the fringe retailers if it cannot reach an agreement with the large retailer.  Accordingly, I 
assume that the disagreement point of the bargaining game in stage two is such that the supplier 
sells all of its products through the fringe retailers in this market while the large retailer makes 
no sales.  The latter implies that the large retailer’s disagreement payoff is 0.  Since this specific 
model is not about bargaining power, I assume for simplicity that the relative bargaining power 
of each large retailer, 𝛾𝑗, is equal to 1 2⁄ .  
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Assume that each fringe retailer has the same marginal cost of retailing, c, as a large retailer.  
But a fringe retailer differs from a large retailer in that it faces a capacity (e.g., shelf space) 
constraint.  To be more specific, suppose that a fringe retailer can sell no more than X units of all 
products combined.  When n products are sold at the same retail price, the fringe retailer will 
divide its X units of capacity evenly among the n products, selling X/n units of each product.   
Since each fringe retailer is a price-taker in both the upstream and downstream markets, the 
supplier can extract all profits from the fringe retailers in a market by charging them a wholesale 
price equal to the difference between the equilibrium retail price and retail cost c.  This implies 
that the combined quasi-rents of the supplier and the large retailer in market j are equal to Π* as 
given by (20).    
Note that if there are a sufficiently large number of fringe retailers in a market, the supplier 
would stop dealing with the large retailer and sell exclusively through the fringe retailers.  To 
eliminate this possibility and ensure that the large retailer in each geographic market j sells a 
positive quantity in equilibrium, assume that μjX is relatively small so that the retail price of a 
good at the disagreement point would be higher than the joint-surplus maximizing price 
determined by (18).   In other words, 𝑝𝑗𝑑 > 𝑝(𝑛), where 𝑝𝑗𝑑 denotes the retail price in market j 
in the event of a disagreement between the supplier and the large retailer.   
The value of  𝑝𝑗𝑑 is determined by the market clearing condition 
𝜇𝑗𝑋
𝑛
= 𝑥�𝑝𝑗𝑑 ,𝑛� = 𝐼𝑠�𝑞𝑗𝑑�
𝑝𝑗𝑑𝑛
.                (23) 
Comparative statics on (23) reveals that 𝜕𝑝𝑗𝑑 𝜕𝑛⁄ > 0 and  𝜕𝑝𝑗𝑑 𝜕𝜇𝑗⁄ < 0; in other words, an 
increase in the number of products raises, and an increase in the number of fringe retailers 
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reduces, the retail price at the disagreement point.  Let  𝜋𝑀
𝑗𝑑  denote the supplier’s disagreement 
payoff in market j.  Since there are 𝜇𝑗 fringe retailers and each fringe retailer has a capacity to 
sell X units, the supplier’s payoff at the disagreement point is: 
𝜋𝑀
𝑗𝑑 = �𝑝𝑗𝑑 − 𝑐�𝜇𝑗𝑋.                     (24) 
Differentiating (24) and using (23), I obtain  
𝜕𝜋𝑀
𝑗𝑑
𝜕𝜇𝑗
= 𝑋𝑝𝑗𝑑 �𝑝𝑗𝑑 − 𝑐
𝑝𝑗𝑑
−
11 + 𝜃(𝑞𝑗𝑑)� > 0.                 (25) 
The sign of (25) is determined with the aid of 𝑝𝑗𝑑 > 𝑝(𝑛), 𝜃′(𝑞) > 0 and (18).  It suggests that 
the supplier’s bargaining position in a market is weaker if there are fewer fringe retailers in the 
market.   Thus, if the large retailer can reduce the number of fringe retailers (through either 
acquisition or aggressive competition), it will weaken the supplier’s bargaining position in this 
market.  Relating to the general framework in section 2, here I have 𝛽𝑗 = −𝜇𝑗.   
However, a reduction in the supplier’s disagreement payoff does not necessarily mean that 
the supplier’s marginal gains from producing an additional product will fall.  That depends on 
the sign of  
𝜕2𝜋𝑀
𝑗𝑑
𝜕𝜇𝑗𝜕𝑛
= −𝑋(1 − 𝜌)𝑝𝑗𝑑𝜃𝑗𝑑2𝜌𝑛(1 + 𝜃𝑗𝑑)3 �𝑠′′𝑞𝑗𝑑𝑠′ + 1 − (𝜃𝑗𝑑)2� ,           (26) 
which can be either positive or negative depending on the sign of 𝑠′′𝑞𝑗𝑑 𝑠′⁄ + 1 − (𝜃𝑗𝑑)2.   This 
implies that a reduction in the number of fringe retailers can either strengthen or weaken the 
supplier’s incentives to engage in product innovation.    To be more specific,  
Proposition 1:8 An increase in the buyer power of the large retailer in market j, brought about by 
                                                 
8 The proofs of this and all subsequent propositions are relegated to the appendix.  
  
20 
a reduction in the number of fringe retailers that weakens the supplier’s bargaining 
position, raises the equilibrium number of products and retail prices in all markets if and 
only if [𝜃(𝑞)]2 < 1 + 𝑠′′(𝑞)𝑞/𝑠′(𝑞).   
Proposition 1 indicates that the effects of buyer power in this model depend on the demand 
condition, as given by the relative magnitudes of [𝜃(𝑞)]2 and 1 + 𝑠′′(𝑞)𝑞/𝑠′(𝑞).  Recall that the 
price elasticity associated with the demand function (11) is 1+ 𝜃(𝑞).  Hence, Proposition 1 
implies that increased buyer power strengthens the supplier’s incentive to invest in product 
innovation and hence raises the equilibrium number of products if the demand elasticity is not 
too large.   
The intuition behind this demand elasticity condition can be understood using (24).  Holding 
𝜇𝑗 (the number of fringe retailers in market j) constant, a larger 𝑛 increases the supplier’s 
disagreement payoff, i.e., 𝜕𝜋𝑀
𝑗𝑑 𝜕𝑛⁄ > 0, because it raises the retail price 𝑝𝑗𝑑.  A fall in  𝜇𝑗 
reduces the total number of units that the supplier can sell in market j in the event of a 
disagreement.  This has two opposing effects on 𝜕𝜋𝑀
𝑗𝑑 𝜕𝑛⁄ .  On the one hand, it reduces the 
marginal impact of a larger 𝑛 on the supplier’s disagreement payoff as fewer units are sold.  On 
the other hand, it raises the marginal benefit of a larger 𝑛 by causing the price 𝑝𝑗𝑑 to rise further.  
The latter effect dominates if the demand elasticity is not too large.   
Note from Proposition 1 that the prices in all geographic markets rise or fall in tandem even 
though the change in buyer power occurs in only one market and the demands are independent 
across the markets.  This is because the same set of products is sold in all markets, and 
consequently a reduction in product diversity affects all markets. 
  
21 
The rich structure of the specific model also enables the analysis of welfare consequences of 
increased buyer power.   
Proposition 2: An increase in the buyer power of the large retailer in market j, brought about by 
a reduction in the number of fringe retailers that weakens the supplier’s bargaining 
position, improves consumer welfare if and only if [𝜃(𝑞)]2 < 1 + 𝑠′′(𝑞)𝑞/𝑠′(𝑞).  But it 
reduces the combined profits of all firms in either case.  Consequently, its effect on social 
welfare is negative if [𝜃(𝑞)]2 > 1 + 𝑠′′(𝑞)𝑞/𝑠′(𝑞) and is ambiguous otherwise. 
Proposition 2 suggests that an increase in buyer power in this specific model raises consumer 
welfare if the demand elasticity is not too large.  A comparison with Proposition 1 indicates the 
change in consumer welfare is in tandem with the change in the equilibrium number of products, 
with higher consumer welfare associated with a larger number of products.  The latter is true 
despite the higher equilibrium prices.   
It is interesting to note that an increase in buyer power in this specific model reduces the 
combined profits of all firms whether the demand elasticity is small or large.  This arises 
because, as shown in the proof of Proposition 2 in Appendix, the same demand elasticity 
condition also determines the impact of 𝑛 (the number of products) on the combined profits.  
Specifically, the combined profits of all firms increase (respectively, decrease) with the number 
of products if the demand elasticity is relatively large (respectively, small).  As a result, the 
combined profits fall because of fewer products in the case where the demand elasticity is 
relatively large. In the case where the demand elasticity is relatively small, the combined profits 
still fall, this time because of more products.   
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3.3 Retailer’s Bargaining Power and Product Innovation 
In the second specific model, I study a situation where a retailer’s buyer power manifests itself 
through its relative bargaining power.  To do so, I abandon the assumption 2/1=jγ and, instead, 
allow jγ to take on any value in the interval (0, 1).  All other aspects of the model are the same 
as that in section 3.2.  Recall, in particular, that the retailer’s disagreement payoff is 0, i.e. 
𝜋𝑅
𝑗𝑑 = 0. 
In this specific model, an improvement in large retailer j’s buyer power is represented by an 
exogenous increase in 𝛾𝑗.9   Using (7) from the general model and noting that, in this specific 
case, 𝛽𝑗 = 𝛾𝑗,   𝑘 = 𝑛, Π𝑗 = Π∗ and 𝜕𝜋𝑅𝑗𝑑 𝜕𝑛⁄ = 0, I obtain: 
𝜕𝑛
𝜕𝛾𝑗
= −𝜕2𝜋𝑀 𝜕𝛾𝑗𝜕𝑛⁄
𝜕2𝜋𝑀 𝜕𝑛2⁄
= − 1
𝜕2𝜋𝑀 𝜕𝑛2⁄
�
𝜕𝜋𝑀
𝑗𝑑
𝜕𝑛
−
𝜕Π∗
𝜕𝑛
� .           (27) 
Note that 𝜕2𝜋𝑀 𝜕𝑛2⁄ < 0 by the second-order condition of the supplier’s optimization problem. 
Then the sign of (27) is determined by the relative magnitudes of 𝜕Π∗ 𝜕𝑛⁄  and 𝜕𝜋𝑀
𝑗𝑑 𝜕𝑛⁄ .  The 
former is given by (21), and the latter can be derived from (24) using (23):  
𝜕𝜋𝑀
𝑗𝑑
𝜕𝑛
= − (1 − 𝜌)𝜇𝑗𝑋𝑝𝑗𝑑𝐼𝑠′�𝑞𝑗𝑑�
𝜌𝑛1 𝜌⁄ [𝜇𝑗𝑋 − 𝐼𝑠′(𝑞𝑗𝑑)𝑛−(1−𝜌) 𝜌⁄ ] > 0.               (28) 
It turns out that the relative magnitudes of these two derivatives depend on the elasticity of 
demand, as indicated in the following proposition.  
Proposition 3: An increase in the bargaining power of the large retailer in market j raises the 
equilibrium number of products, retail prices and consumer welfare in all markets if and 
only if [𝜃(𝑞)]2 < 1 + 𝑠′′(𝑞)𝑞/𝑠′(𝑞).  Its effect on social welfare is negative if [𝜃(𝑞)]2 >
                                                 
9 In section 5, I develop a theory of endogenous bargaining power that establishes a link between 𝛾𝑗 and 
the size of retailer j.  
  
23 
1 + 𝑠′′(𝑞)𝑞/𝑠′(𝑞) and is ambiguous otherwise. 
Proposition 3 is surprising because 𝛾𝑗 determines how the gains from trade is divided 
between the supplier and retailer j.  One might have thought that a larger 𝛾𝑗 should reduce the 
supplier’s share of both the total gain of and the marginal gain of selling 𝑛 products, thus 
unambiguously reducing the equilibrium number of products.  The reason this intuition fails is 
that, as can be seen in (2) (with 𝜋𝑅
𝑗𝑑 = 0), a larger 𝛾𝑗 reduces the supplier’s share of Π∗ (the joint 
quasi-rents from the sales in market j) but increases the influence of 𝜋𝑀
𝑗𝑑  (the supplier’s 
disagreement payoff in market j) on the supplier’s payoff.  Thus, the net effect of a larger 𝛾𝑗 on 
the supplier’s payoff in market j is 𝜕𝜋𝑀
𝑗 𝜕𝛾𝑗� = −�Π∗ − 𝜋𝑀𝑗𝑑� < 0.  Accordingly, in (27) the 
marginal impact of 𝛾𝑗 on the supplier’s marginal gain of an additional product depends on the 
difference between 𝜕𝜋𝑀
𝑗𝑑 𝜕𝑛⁄  and  𝜕Π∗ 𝜕𝑛⁄ .  While a larger number of products raises both 𝜋𝑀
𝑗𝑑  
and Π∗, the supplier would want to increase the number of products in response to a larger 𝛾𝑗 as 
long as the rise in the former is faster than the increase in the latter, i.e., 𝜕𝜋𝑀
𝑗𝑑 𝜕𝑛⁄ > 𝜕Π∗ 𝜕𝑛⁄ .  
This is indeed true when the demand elasticity is not too large.10   
A comparison of Proposition 3 with Propositions 1 and 2 reveals that qualitatively an 
increase in the retailer’s bargaining power has the same effects as a reduction in the number of 
fringe retailers.  But the mechanism through which the buyer power affects product innovation is 
different.  To be specific, consider the case where the elasticity of demand is large.  If increased 
buyer power weakens the supplier’s bargaining position, the supplier offers fewer products as a 
way to counteract the erosion of its bargaining position (see (25) and (26)).  If the buyer power 
                                                 
10 The demand elasticity plays a role here because it influences how high the price will rise and by how 
much the quasi-rents (Π∗ and 𝜋𝑀
𝑗𝑑) will increase when 𝑛 becomes larger.   
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manifests itself through stronger bargaining power on the part of the retailer, on the other hand, 
reducing the number of products actually lowers the supplier’s disagreement payoff  𝜋𝑀
𝑗𝑑  and 
thus weakens its bargaining position (see (28)).  But it lowers the joint quasi-rents Π∗ even more 
because 𝜕Π∗ 𝜕𝑛⁄ > 𝜕𝜋𝑀𝑗𝑑 𝜕𝑛⁄  when the demand elasticity is relatively large.  By narrowing the 
difference Π∗ − 𝜋𝑀
𝑗𝑑, the reduction in the number of products mitigates the impact of a larger 𝛾𝑗 
on the supplier’s payoff.       
3.4 Retailer’s Bargaining Position and Product Innovation  
In the third specific model, buyer power manifests itself through the retailer’s bargaining 
position.   The model is based on the idea that it is easier for a large retailer to find an alternative 
source of supply than for a small retailer.  For example, it may be more attractive for a chain 
store to develop and produce its own version (the store brand) of the supplier’s products because 
it is able to spread the fixed costs of developing each product over a large number of markets.11   
The larger is the chain, the lower are the average fixed costs of developing a product.   
To simplify the presentation, I consider a situation where one and only one of the l large 
retailers is a chain store that sells in multiple geographic markets.  To be more specific, suppose 
that the chain store operates an outlet in each of 𝜆 (< m) geographic markets, while each of the 
remaining 𝑚 − 𝜆 markets is served by a single-outlet retailer.  This implies 𝑙 = 𝑚 − 𝜆 + 1. 
To keep the focus of the analysis on the chain store’s bargaining position, I assume that there 
                                                 
11 Galbraith (1952 p126) is among the early authors who discussed such a possibility: “The retail buyers 
have a variety of weapons at their disposal to use against the market power of their suppliers.  Their 
ultimate sanction is to develop their own source of supply as the food chains, Sears, Roebuck and 
Montgomery Ward have extensively done.”  This idea has been analyzed by, among others, Inderst and 
Wey (2011).  Differences between the present model and Inderst and Wey (2011) are discussed below.   
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are no fringe retailers so that the disagreement payoff of the supplier is 0.12  Since the interest 
here is not in retailers’ bargaining power, I assume that 𝛾𝑗 = 1 2⁄  for all large retailers. 
Let 𝑓𝑅 denote the fixed costs of developing a product by a retailer.  Suppose that 𝑓𝑅 ≥ 𝑓; that 
is, the retailer is no more efficient than the supplier at developing a product.  Moreover, because 
the store brand produced by the retailer is only an imitation of the supplier’s products, I assume 
that at the same p and n, the demand for the imitation is lower than that for the supplier’s original 
product.  With reference to (11), I write the demand for the retailer’s imitation product as 
𝑧𝑖 = 𝛼𝐼𝑠(𝑞)𝑝𝑛 ,                     (29) 
where 0 < 𝛼 < 1.  Therefore, holding everything else constant, the retailer prefers purchasing 
from the supplier over producing its own store brand.  The store brand, then, is only used as a 
threat point in the chain store’s negotiation with the supplier.  
Therefore, the disagreement point in the bargaining game between the chain store and the 
supplier is one where the retailer would produce and sell its store brand and the supplier would 
make no sales in these λ markets.  The disagreement payoff of the chain store is 
𝜋𝑅
𝐶𝑑 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑝  �𝜆(𝑝 − 𝑐)𝛼𝐼𝑠(𝑞)𝑝𝑛 − 𝑓𝑅� 𝑛,           (30) 
while that of the supplier is 0.  It is easy to see that 𝜋𝑅𝐶𝑑 is increasing in λ.  I focus on the case 
where λ is large enough that 𝜋𝑅
𝐶𝑑 > 0.13  On the other hand, suppose  𝜋𝑅𝐶𝑑 < 0 at λ = 1, so that it 
is not profitable for a single-store retailer to launch its store brand.   
Accordingly, an increase in the size of the chain store (as measured by λ) strengthens the 
                                                 
12 The results would be the same if I assume that there are 𝜇 fringe retailers in each market. 
13 If πRCd < 0, it is not in the interest of the chain store to develop the store brand.  The disagreement point 
then becomes (0, 0), in which case a marginal increase in the size of the chain store would have no impact 
on the retailer’s bargaining position.  
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retailer’s bargaining position.  Moreover,  
𝜕2𝜋𝑅
𝐶𝑑
𝜕𝑛𝜕𝜆
= −𝛼(1 − 𝜌)(𝑝 − 𝑐)𝐼𝑠′
𝜌𝑛1 𝜌⁄
> 0.               (31) 
In other words, an increase in the number of differentiated products magnifies the strengthening 
of the chain store’s bargaining position brought about by its larger size.  The general theory in 
section 2 then suggests that an increase in the size of the retailer will reduce the supplier’s 
incentive to engage in product innovation.  Indeed,   
Proposition 4: An improvement in the bargaining position of the chain store, brought about by 
its larger size, reduces the equilibrium number of products and retail prices in all markets.  
As a result, the combined profits of all firms, the consumer welfare and social welfare fall 
in all markets.  
Intuitively, the underlying reason for the sign of (31) and Proposition 4 is that the consumers 
value product diversity.   Accordingly, a larger number of products would enable the chain store 
to earn more quasi-rents from its store brand in each of the markets it serves in the event of a 
disagreement.14  This, in turn, would magnify the increase in the chain store’s disagreement 
payoff as it grows larger.  Thus, to counteract the strengthening of the chain store’s bargaining 
position arising from its larger size, the supplier has to offer fewer products.   
The welfare result in Proposition 4 is somewhat surprising because one would normally have 
expected that a change that lowers the prices and reduces the combined profits of all firms should 
benefit consumers.  In this model, however, the more significant factor is the reduction in the 
number of products.  The effects of this reduced product diversity dominate those of lower 
                                                 
14 Only the quasi-rents matter in (31) because the fixed costs of developing the store brand, 𝑛𝑓𝑅, are 
independent of 𝜆.  
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prices.  Consequently, consumers lose.  Social welfare is also lower because both consumer 
welfare and total profits are down. 
This specific model builds on the same idea as Inderst and Wey (2011) that the large retailer 
has the option of developing its own source of supply.   The main difference between these two 
models is that the present model is about product innovation rather than process innovation.  
Through product innovation, the supplier is able to influence the large retailer’s revenues from 
the alternative source of supply in the event of disagreement.   This channel of influence does not 
exist in the process innovation studied by Inderst and Wey (2011).  Instead, the supplier in their 
model affects the large retailer’s profits from the alternative source of supply through the 
retailer’s rivals: A lower marginal cost achieved through the supplier’s process innovation makes 
these rivals more competitive, thus reducing the large retailer’s profits from the alternative 
supply option.   
Another important difference from Inderst and Wey (2011) is that consumer preferences are 
explicitly modelled in the present analysis.15  This enables the examination of the welfare 
consequences of increased buyer power.      
4. Process Innovation 
In this section, I investigate the supplier’s incentives to engage in process innovation.  To be 
more specific, let CM(t) denote the supplier’s marginal cost of production, where t is the amount 
of investment in process innovation.  The investment reduces the cost, i.e., 𝐶𝑀′ (𝑡) < 0.   I assume 
𝐶𝑀
′′(𝑡) is positive and is sufficiently large that the second-order condition associated with the 
                                                 
15 A technical difference between these two models is that in the present model, the option of an 
alternative source of supply affects the disagreement point.  Thus, the alternative source of supply is 
effectively treated as an inside option (see, for example, Muthoo 1999).  In Inderst and Wey (2011), on 
the other hand, it is modelled as an outside option.   
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choice of t is satisfied.  This assumption implies that the investment in process innovation is 
subject to significant diminishing returns.  Since the focus here is on process innovation, I take 
the number of differentiated goods manufactured by the supplier as exogenously fixed.  All 
remaining aspects of the model are the same as in section 3.1.   
Given that the number of differentiated goods is fixed, I can simplify the presentation greatly 
by expressing the differentiated goods in terms of the composite good 𝑦 ≡ �∑ 𝑥𝑖
𝜌𝑛
𝑖=1 �
1/𝜌
 and its 
price index 𝑞 ≡ �∑ 𝑝𝑖
−𝜌 (1−𝜌)⁄𝑛
𝑖=1 �
−(1−𝜌)/𝜌
.   Define 𝑆(𝑞) = 𝑠(𝑞)/𝑞.   Then using (11) and the 
definitions of y and q, I can write the demand for y as: 𝑦 = 𝐼𝑆(𝑞).  The assumption 𝑠′(𝑞) < 0 
implies that 𝑆′(𝑞) < 0.  Suppose that the marginal cost of production CM(t) is expressed in units 
of y.  Let C denote the retail cost of selling one unit of y.       
Given that non-linear contracts are used, the supplier and each large retailer are able to 
maximize the joint quasi-rents in a geographic market:  
Π�∗ = 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑞(𝑞 − 𝐶𝑀 − 𝐶)𝐼𝑆(𝑞).                   (32) 
The first-order condition to (32) is: (𝑞 − 𝐶𝑀 − 𝐶)𝐼𝑆′(𝑞) + 𝐼𝑆(𝑞) = 0 .                 (33) 
It is easy to verify that the value of q determined by (33) rises with CM.  
Using this framework of process innovation, I examine the impact of buyer power on the 
supplier’s incentive to innovate in the same way as in section 3.  Specifically, I study the same 
three channels of buyer power: the supplier’s bargaining position, the retailer’s relative 
bargaining power, and the retailer’s bargaining position. 
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4.1 Supplier’s Bargaining Position and Process Innovation 
Reconsider the model in section 3.2, and let Y denote the capacity of a fringe retailer in units of 
y.  In the event of failure to reach an agreement with retailer j, the supplier would sell its 
products through the fringe retailers in market j, at price 𝑞𝑗𝑑 as determined in 𝐼𝑆�𝑞𝑗𝑑� = 𝜇𝑗𝑌.  It 
is easy to verify that 𝑞𝑗𝑑 decreases with 𝜇𝑗.  Note that 𝑞𝑗𝑑 is independent of the supplier’s 
marginal cost 𝐶𝑀.  The supplier’s bargaining position is represented by  
𝜋�𝑀
𝑗𝑑 = 𝜇𝑗𝑌�𝑞𝑗𝑑 − 𝐶𝑀 − 𝐶�.               (34) 
It can be seen from (34) that a reduction in the supplier’s marginal cost (𝐶𝑀) improves its 
bargaining position.  Furthermore, since 
𝜕2𝜋�𝑀
𝑗𝑑
𝜕𝜇𝑗𝜕𝑡
= 𝜕2𝜋�𝑀𝑗𝑑
𝜕𝜇𝑗𝜕𝐶𝑀
𝐶𝑀
′ (𝑡) = −𝑌𝐶𝑀′ (𝑡) > 0,                (35) 
a reduction in the number of fringe retailers decreases the marginal effect of investment in 
process innovation on the supplier’s bargaining position.   
Proposition 5: An increase in the buyer power of the large retailer in market j, brought about by 
a reduction in the number of fringe retailers that weakens the supplier’s bargaining 
position, causes the supplier to decrease its investment in process innovation.  Both 
consumer welfare and social welfare are lower as a result.  
Given the fixed capacity of each fringe retailer, a fall in their number in a market reduces the 
number of units that the supplier is able to sell through the fringe retailers.  This, in turn, 
decreases the amount of cost savings that the supplier can reap in the event that it fails to reach 
an agreement with the large retailer in this market.   This, it reduces the supplier’s marginal 
benefit from the investment in process innovation.   
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A comparison of Proposition 5 with Propositions 1 and 2 demonstrates that increased buyer 
power arising from the same source (here a weakening of the supplier’s bargaining position) can 
have different effects for different types of innovation.  In the case of product innovation, 
increased buyer power may increase or decrease the number of products depending on the 
demand elasticity.  But it unambiguously reduces the investment in process innovation.  
4.2 Retailer’s Bargaining Power and Process Innovation 
Now suppose retailer j’s bargaining power 𝛾𝑗 can take on any value in the interval (0, 1), and 
consider the effects of an increase in 𝛾𝑗 in the model of process innovation.   Applying (7) in the 
general framework to the present model, I find that the effects of 𝛾𝑗 depends on the sign of 
𝜕Π�∗
𝜕𝑡
−
𝜕𝜋�𝑀
𝑗𝑑
𝜕𝑡
= −𝐼𝑆(𝑞)𝐶𝑀′ (𝑡) − �−𝜇𝑗𝑌𝐶𝑀′ (𝑡)� =  �𝐼𝑆�𝑞𝑗𝑑� − 𝐼𝑆(𝑞)�𝐶𝑀′ (𝑡).      (36)     
It turns out that the sign of (36) is positive because 𝐶𝑀′ (𝑡) < 0 and 𝐼𝑆�𝑞𝑗𝑑� < 𝐼𝑆(𝑞) (the 
quantity sold through the fringe retailers in market j in the event of disagreement is less than that 
sold through both the fringe retailers and the large retailer j in equilibrium).  This implies that the 
supplier’s marginal gains from an additional unit of investment in process innovation are smaller 
when retailer j has stronger bargaining power.  As a result,  
Proposition 6: An increase in the bargaining power of a large retailer causes the supplier to 
decrease its investment in process innovation.  Both consumer welfare and social welfare 
are lower as a result.  
When buyer power manifests itself through the retailer’s bargaining power, the supplier’s 
incentive to invest in process innovation depends on the difference between 𝜕Π�∗ 𝜕𝑡⁄  and 
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𝜕𝜋�𝑀
𝑗𝑑/𝜕𝑡.  The former is larger than the latter because more units are sold and hence an 
additional unit of investment generates a larger cost saving at the equilibrium point than at the 
disagreement point.  
4.3 Retailer’s Bargaining Position and Process Innovation 
Suppose that, as in section 3.4, a chain store has the option of offering its store brand, whose 
demand is given by (29).  Let 𝐶𝑅 be the chain store’s marginal cost of production in units of y.  
Then the chain store’s disagreement payoff can be written as: 
𝜋�𝑅
𝐶𝑑 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑞[𝜆(𝑞 − 𝐶𝑅 − 𝐶)𝛼𝐼𝑆(𝑞) − 𝑛𝑓𝑅].                   (37) 
From (37), it is clear that 𝜕𝜋�𝑅𝐶𝑑 𝜕𝜆⁄ > 0.  Note, however, a reduction in the marginal cost of the 
supplier has no impact on the chain store’s disagreement payoff.  Thus, while an increase in the 
number of stores operated by the retailer improves its bargaining position and allows it to reap a 
larger profit in equilibrium, the supplier is not able to influence the retailer’s bargaining position 
through its investment in process innovation.   Therefore, 
Proposition 7: An improvement in the bargaining position of the chain store, brought about by its 
larger size, has no impact on the supplier’s incentives to engage in process innovation.    
This result is obviously different from that in the case of product innovation.  The difference 
arises from that the supplier is able to influence the chain store’s bargaining position through 
product innovation, but not through process innovation.   
One way to create a link between the chain store’s bargaining position and the supplier’s 
investment in process innovation is by introducing competition into the downstream market.  A 
lower marginal cost would enable the supplier to sell its products to the chain store’s competitors 
at lower prices.  This may allow the supplier to reduce the chain store’s disagreement payoff.  
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Indeed, that is the type of situations examined in Inderst and Wey (2011).   
Interestingly, the incorporation of fringe retailers with fixed capacity into the present model 
would not change the result in Proposition 7.  Given that these fringe retailers have fixed 
capacity, the chain store’s bargaining position is still unaffected by the supplier’s investment in 
process innovation because a lower cost of production does not change the total quantity 
supplied by the fringe retailers in a market.  On the other hand, while the supplier’s bargaining 
position is strengthened by more investment in process innovation, it is not affected by the size 
of the chain store.  As a result, the supplier’s investment in process innovation would still be 
independent of the retailer’s size.  
The preceding discussion suggests that the finding in Inderst and Wey (2011) that buyer 
power stimulates investment in process innovation depends on the assumption that the 
competitors of the strong retailer have elastic supply curves.  If their supply is perfectly inelastic, 
an increase in buyer power would have no effect on the supplier’s incentive to invest in process 
innovation.    
5. Extension: Endogenous Bargaining Power 
The analysis in the preceding two sections assumes that relative bargaining power of each large 
retailer (i.e., 𝛾𝑗) is exogenously given.  It is natural to ask, where does the bargaining power of a 
large retailer come from?  In the literature, however, there has been no formal argument for how 
the size of a retailer would affect its bargaining power (Inderst and Wey 2011 p708).  Below I 
fill this gap by proposing a theory to show that the buyer power conferred by the retailer’s size 
can manifest itself through its bargaining power.  
The idea behind the theory is that a firm’s bargaining power is a function of the quality of its 
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negotiators in terms of their negotiation skills, knowledge and experience.  A firm can spend 
money to enhance the quality of its negotiation team.  For example, it can hire better negotiators 
or provide more training to the employees assigned to the negotiation team.16  If the marginal 
return from the enhanced bargaining power (relative to that of the supplier) is higher as a retailer 
becomes larger, it will want to spend more money on improving the quality of its negotiation 
team.   
To develop this theory, I extend the model in section 3.3 by endogenizing the relative 
bargaining power of each large retailer j.  Recall that in this model retailer j faces competition 
from 𝜇𝑗 fringe retailers and each fringe retailer has a fixed capacity.  This implies that a fall in 
the number of fringe retailers  𝜇𝑗 expands the residual demand facing the large retailer and 
enables it to sell a larger quantity in equilibrium.  Thus, the size of retailer j, measured by the 
quantity it sells, is inversely related to 𝜇𝑗.  To complete the theory, I need to establish a link 
between the number of fringe retailers in market j and retailer j’s bargaining power.    
Specifically, suppose that retailer j and the supplier would have equal bargaining power, i.e., 
𝛾𝑗 = 1 2⁄ , if neither firm spend any additional resources on its negotiation team. Moreover, each 
firm can attempt to enhance its bargaining power by investing in the quality of its negotiators.  
Let  𝑏𝑅
𝑗  (respectively, 𝑏𝑀) denote the amount of money spent by retailer j (respectively, the 
supplier) on its negotiation team.  The equilibrium value of 𝛾𝑗 is determined by the relative 
                                                 
16 In his discussion of retailer power, Galbraith (1952 p127) pointed out that large retailers at the time 
(such as the A&P and Sears, Roebuck) attached great importance to their “buyers”, those employees who 
were in charge of purchasing goods from the suppliers. “A measure of the importance which large 
retailing organizations attach to the deployment of their countervailing power is the prestige they accord 
to their buyers.  These men (and women) are the key employees of the modern large retail organization; 
they are highly paid and they are among the most intelligent and resourceful people to be found anywhere 
in business.”   
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qualities of the negotiation teams as follows:   
𝛾𝑗 = 12 + 𝛿�𝑏𝑅𝑗) − 𝛿(𝑏𝑀�,            (38) 
where 𝛿(𝑏) represents the additional advantage a firm can gain in tipping the balance of 
bargaining power in its own favour via an investment of b.   To simplify analysis, I assume that 
this function takes the form,  
𝛿(𝑏) = 𝛿0𝑏 − 12 𝛿1𝑏2   (𝛿0 > 0, 𝛿1 > 0).       (39) 
It implies that the investment in the quality of negotiators is subject to diminishing returns.  
I now modify stage 2 of the general model by assuming that this stage begins with the 
supplier and the large retailers choosing, simultaneously, the quality of their negotiation teams.  
Then the negotiation team of the supplier conducts bargaining, sequentially, with the negotiation 
team of each retailer.   The outcome of the bargaining process is determined by the generalized 
Nash bargaining solution, with the equilibrium value of 𝛾𝑗 determined by (38). 
Next, I solve the equilibrium in this modified stage 2 to find the relationship between 𝛾𝑗 and 
𝜇𝑗.   Using (2) and (38) and recalling 𝜋𝑅
𝑗𝑑 = 0, I write the supplier’s optimization problem with 
regard to  𝑏𝑀 as: 
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑏𝑀  𝜋𝑀 = ��1 − �12 + 𝛿�𝑏𝑅𝑖 � − 𝛿(𝑏𝑀)��Π∗𝑚
𝑖=1
+ ��12 + 𝛿�𝑏𝑅𝑖 � − 𝛿(𝑏𝑀)�𝜋𝑀𝑖𝑑𝑚
𝑖=1
− 𝑏𝑀 − 𝑛𝑓.  (40) 
Using (39), I solve (40) to find: 
𝑏𝑀 = 𝛿0𝛿1 − 1𝛿1(𝑚Π∗ − ∑ 𝜋𝑀𝑖𝑑𝑚𝑖=1 ).           (41) 
Similarly, I use (3) and (38) to write retailer j’s optimization problem regarding 𝑏𝑅
𝑗  as:  
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𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑏𝑅
𝑗  𝜋𝑅𝑗 = �12 + 𝛿�𝑏𝑅𝑗� − 𝛿(𝑏𝑀)�Π∗ − �12 + 𝛿�𝑏𝑅𝑗� − 𝛿(𝑏𝑀)�𝜋𝑀𝑗𝑑 − 𝑏𝑅𝑗 .           (42) 
The solution to (42) is:  
𝑏𝑅
𝑗 = 𝛿0
𝛿1
−
1
𝛿1�Π∗ − 𝜋𝑀
𝑗𝑑�
.        (43) 
Keep in mind that in (41) and (43), the number of fringe retailers 𝜇𝑗 affects a firm’s spending on 
its negotiation team through 𝜋𝑀
𝑗𝑑 .  Conducting comparative statics using (38), (39), (41) and (43), 
I find 
𝜕𝛾𝑗
𝜕𝜇𝑗
= 𝜕𝜋𝑀𝑗𝑑 𝜕𝜇𝑗�
𝛿1
�
1(𝑚Π∗ − ∑ 𝜋𝑀𝑖𝑑𝑚𝑖=1 )3 − 1�Π∗ − 𝜋𝑀𝑗𝑑�3� < 0.          (44) 
The sign of (44) is determined by observing that 𝜕𝜋𝑀
𝑗𝑑 𝜕𝜇𝑗� > 0  and Π∗ > 𝜋𝑀𝑖𝑑 in every market.  
It suggests that a reduction in the number of fringe retailers in market j indeed enhances retailer 
j’s bargaining power.  Intuitively, (41) and (43) imply that the reduction in 𝜇𝑗, which decreases 
𝜋𝑀
𝑗𝑑 , prompts both the supplier and retailer j to spend more money on its negotiation team.  But 
this effect is stronger for retailer j than for the supplier, leading to the strengthening of the 
retailer’s bargaining power.  This demonstrates that the buyer power conferred by a retailer’s 
size can indeed manifest itself through the retailer’s relative bargaining power.  
This extended model also illustrates how a particular source of buyer power can manifest 
itself through multiple channels.  By now we have seen that a reduction in the number of fringe 
retailers strengthens the large retailer’s buyer power through two channels: the supplier’s 
bargaining position (𝜋𝑀
𝑗𝑑) and the retailer’s relative bargaining power (𝛾𝑗).   Propositions 1 and 3 
imply that the buyer power manifested through these two channels reinforce each other, both 
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strengthening the supplier’s incentive to invest in product innovation if and only if [𝜃(𝑞)]2 <1 + 𝑠′′(𝑞)𝑞/𝑠′(𝑞).   
A careful examination of the supplier’s optimization problem regarding n reveals that there is 
a third channel.  It works indirectly through the large retailer’s spending on the quality of their 
negotiators.  To see this, consider the supplier’s choice of n in stage 1, where it maximizes the 
profits given in (40), taking into consideration (41) and (43).  Using the envelope theorem and 
noting that Π∗ is a function of n, I obtain the following first-order condition: 
𝜕Π∗
𝜕𝑛
 ��1 − �12 + 𝛿�𝑏𝑅𝑖 � − 𝛿(𝑏𝑀)��𝑚
𝑖=1
+ ��12 + 𝛿�𝑏𝑅𝑖 � − 𝛿(𝑏𝑀)�𝜕𝜋𝑀𝑖𝑑𝜕𝑛  𝑚
𝑖=1
   
−��Π∗ − 𝜋𝑀
𝑖𝑑��𝛿0 − 𝛿1𝑏𝑅
𝑖 �
𝑚
𝑖=1
𝜕𝑏𝑅
𝑖
𝜕𝑛
   = 𝑓.      (45) 
Parameter 𝜇𝑗 affects each of the three terms on the left-hand side of (45).  The effects of  𝜇𝑗 on 1 2⁄ + 𝛿�𝑏𝑅𝑗� − 𝛿(𝑏𝑀) (i.e., 𝛾𝑗) in the first and the second term represent the channel through the 
retailer’s bargaining power.  Its effect on 𝜕𝜋𝑀
𝑗𝑑 𝜕𝑛⁄  in the second term reflects the channel 
through the supplier’s bargaining position.  The third term in (45) represents the indirect effect of 
n on the supplier’s profit through each larger retailer’s spending on its negotiation team, as 
captured by 𝜕𝑏𝑅𝑖 𝜕𝑛⁄ .   It can be shown that the effect of 𝜇𝑗 through this third channel would go 
in the same direction as the other two channels if the sign of  𝜕2𝑏𝑅
𝑗 𝜕𝜇𝑗𝜕𝑛�  is the opposite to 
𝜕2𝜋𝑀
𝑗𝑑 𝜕𝜇𝑗𝜕𝑛� .   
Finally, it should be pointed out that the results from the analysis of this extended model are 
robust to extensions of other specific models presented in sections 3 and 4.  In particular, I have 
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studied an extension to the chain store model in section 3.4, and I can show that an increase in 
the number of stores in the chain causes the chain store to boost its spending, and the supplier to 
reduce its spending, on their respective negotiation teams.  Both factors strengthen the retailer’s 
bargaining power.17   
6. Conclusions 
In this paper, I have constructed a theoretical framework to study the impact of buyer power on 
the supplier’s incentives to innovate.  Subsumed in the general framework are two sets of 
specific models: one on product innovation and the other on process innovation.  Through the 
analysis of these models, I have found that the effects of buyer power on innovation depend on 
the type of innovation, the source of buyer power, and the channel through which the buyer 
power manifests itself.  For example, while the buyer power resulted from a reduction in retail 
channels weakens the supplier’s incentives to innovate and reduces welfare in the case of process 
innovation, its effects in the case of product innovation can go either way depending on the 
property of the demand function.  In particular, it enhances the incentive to invest in product 
innovation and improves consumer welfare if the demand elasticity is not large.  However, the 
supplier’s incentive to engage in product innovation is weakened if the increased buyer power 
comes from the larger size of a chain store that improves the latter’s bargaining position.  The 
analysis of the specific models has revealed a number of mechanisms through buyer power 
affects supplier innovation and welfare.  
                                                 
17 Details of this extension are not presented here because of space constraint.  But they are available 
upon request.   
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Appendix  
 
Proof of Propositions 
 
Proof of Proposition 1:  Using (2), (20) and (24) and setting 𝛾𝑗 = 1 2⁄ , I write the supplier’s 
optimization problem in stage 1 as, 
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑛𝜋𝑀 = �Π∗ + 𝜋𝑀𝑗𝑑2𝑚
𝑗=1
− 𝑛𝑓 = �12 �[𝑝(𝑛) − 𝑐] 𝐼𝑠�𝑞(𝑛)�𝑝(𝑛) + �𝑝𝑗𝑑�𝑛, 𝜇𝑗� − 𝑐�𝜇𝑗𝑋�𝑚
𝑗=1
− 𝑛𝑓.  (𝐴1) 
The first-order condition of the supplier’s optimization problem (A1) is:  
−
[𝑝(𝑛) − 𝑐]𝐼𝑠′�𝑞(𝑛)�(1 − 𝜌)2𝜌𝑛1 𝜌⁄ + 𝑋2 � 𝜇𝑗 𝜕𝑝𝑗𝑑𝜕𝑛𝑚𝑗=1 = 𝑓.        (𝐴2) 
Comparative statics on (A2) reveals: 
𝜕𝑛
𝜕𝜇𝑗
= 𝑋(1− 𝜌)𝑝𝑗𝑑𝜃(𝑞𝑗𝑑)2𝜌𝑛[1 + 𝜃(𝑞𝑗𝑑)]3 �∂2𝜋𝑀 ∂𝑛2⁄ � �1 + 𝑠′′(𝑞𝑗𝑑)𝑞𝑗𝑑𝑠′(𝑞𝑗𝑑) − �𝜃(𝑞𝑗𝑑)�2�,       (𝐴3) 
which is negative if and only if [𝜃(𝑞)]2 < 1 + 𝑠′′(𝑞)𝑞/𝑠′(𝑞) at 𝑞 = 𝑞𝑗𝑑.   The impact on retailer 
prices follows from (19).  QED 
Proof of Proposition 2:  Consumer welfare changes in the same direction as n because  
𝜕𝑉 𝜕𝜇𝑗⁄ = [𝑑𝑉(𝑝(𝑛), 𝐼, 𝑛))/𝑑𝑛] (𝜕𝑛/𝜕𝜇𝑗  ) has the same sign as 𝜕𝑛/𝜕𝜇𝑗.  (Keep in mind that 
an increase in retailer’s j buyer power is measured by a reduction in 𝜇𝑗). 
The combined profits of all firms is Π𝑇 = 𝑚Π∗ − 𝑛𝑓.  Using (21) and (A2), I find: 
𝜕Π𝑇
𝜕𝑛
= (1 − 𝜌)𝐼2𝜌𝑛 � �𝜃(𝑞)𝑠(𝑞)1 + 𝜃(𝑞) − 𝜃(𝑞𝑗𝑑)𝑠(𝑞𝑗𝑑)1 + 𝜃(𝑞𝑗𝑑) �𝑚𝑗=1 .       (𝐴4) 
The assumption of small 𝜇𝑗𝑋 implies that 𝑞 < 𝑞𝑗𝑑.  It can be verified that 𝜃(𝑞) 𝑠(𝑞) [1 + 𝜃(𝑞)]⁄  
is increasing (respectively, decreasing) in q if [𝜃(𝑞)]2 is less than (respectively, greater than) 
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1 + 𝑠′′(𝑞)𝑞/𝑠′(𝑞).   Therefore,  𝜕Π𝑇 𝜕𝑛⁄ < 0 if and only if [𝜃(𝑞)]2 < 1 + 𝑠′′(𝑞)𝑞/𝑠′(𝑞).  
Combining (A3) and (A4), I conclude that 𝜕Π𝑇 𝜕𝜇𝑗⁄ = (𝜕Π𝑇 𝜕𝑛⁄ )�𝜕𝑛 𝜕𝜇𝑗⁄ � > 0 as long as 1 + 𝑠′′(𝑞)𝑞/𝑠′(𝑞) − [𝜃(𝑞)]2  maintains the same sign for q in the relevant range.  The change in 
total welfare is determined by 
𝜕𝑊
𝜕𝜇𝑗
= 𝑑𝑊
𝑑𝑛
𝜕𝑛
𝜕𝜇𝑗
= �𝑑𝑉
𝑑𝑛
+ 1
𝑚
𝜕𝑉
𝜕𝐼
𝜕Π𝑇
𝜕𝑛
�
𝜕𝑛
𝜕𝜇𝑗
,      (𝐴5) 
which has a positive sign if  [𝜃(𝑞)]2 > 1 + 𝑠′′(𝑞)𝑞/𝑠′(𝑞), but has an ambiguous sign otherwise.  
QED 
Proof of Proposition 3: Using (18) to rewrite (21) and (23) to rewrite (28), I obtain: 
𝜕Π∗
𝜕𝑛
−
𝜕𝜋𝑀
𝑗𝑑
𝜕𝑛
= (1 − 𝜌)𝐼
𝜌𝑛
�
𝜃(𝑞)𝑠(𝑞)1 + 𝜃(𝑞) − 𝜃(𝑞𝑗𝑑)𝑠(𝑞𝑗𝑑)1 + 𝜃(𝑞𝑗𝑑) � .                (𝐴6) 
The discussions after (A4) imply that the sign of (A6) is negative if and only if [𝜃(𝑞)]2 < 1 +
𝑠′′(𝑞)𝑞/𝑠′(𝑞).  Then (27) implies that 𝜕𝑛 𝜕𝛾𝑗⁄ > 0 under the same condition.  The proof of the 
remaining results in this proposition is the same as that of Proposition 2.  QED 
Proof of Proposition 4:  Using (2) and (20) and setting 𝛾𝑗 = 1 2⁄ , I obtain the Nash bargaining 
solution for the supplier: 
𝜋𝑀
𝐶 = 12 �𝜆(𝑝 − 𝑐)𝐼𝑠(𝑞)𝑝 − 𝜋𝑅𝐶𝑑� .         (𝐴7) 
Since a single-store retailer does not find it profitable to offer a store brand, the Nash bargaining 
solution for such a retailer and the supplier is Π∗ 2⁄  for each.  Using (20), (30) and (A7), I write 
the supplier’s total profits from m markets as 
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑛𝜋𝑀 = 𝜋𝑀𝐶 + (𝑚− 𝜆) �Π∗2 � − 𝑛𝑓 = 12 �(𝑚− 𝜆𝛼)[𝑝(𝑛) − 𝑐] 𝐼𝑠�𝑞(𝑛)�𝑝(𝑛) + 𝑛𝑓𝑅� − 𝑛𝑓.    (𝐴8) 
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The first-order condition of (A8) implies 
−(𝑚− 𝛼𝜆)(𝑝 − 𝑐) �1 − 𝜌
𝜌𝑛1 𝜌⁄
� 𝐼𝑠′ + 𝑓𝑅 − 2𝑓 = 0.      (𝐴9) 
Conducting comparative statics on (A9), I find 𝜕𝑛 𝜕𝜆⁄ < 0.  Using the same procedure as in the 
proof of Propositions 1 and 2, I conclude that 𝜕𝑝 𝜕𝜆⁄ < 0 and 𝜕𝑉(𝑝(𝑛), 𝐼,𝑛) 𝜕𝜆⁄ < 0.  Totally 
differentiating the combined profits, Π𝑇 = 𝑚Π∗ − 𝑛𝑓, with respect to n and using (A9), I obtain: 
∂Π𝑇
𝜕𝜆
= −𝛼𝜆(𝑝 − 𝑐) �1 − 𝜌
𝜌𝑛1 𝜌⁄
� 𝐼𝑠′
𝜕𝑛
𝜕𝜆
< 0.       (𝐴10) 
Then using (14), I can show 𝜕𝑊 𝜕𝜆⁄ < 0.     QED    
Proof of Proposition 5: Using (32) and (33), I express the supplier’s optimization problem as: 
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑡  𝜋�𝑀 = 12� (Π�∗ + 𝜋�𝑀𝑗𝑑)𝑚𝑗=1 − 𝑡 = 12� �(𝑞 − 𝐶𝑀 − 𝐶)𝐼𝑆(𝑞) + 𝜇𝑗𝑌�𝑞𝑗𝑑 − 𝐶𝑀 − 𝐶��𝑚𝑗=1 − 𝑡.  (𝐴11) 
With the aid of the envelope theory, the first-order condition of the supplier’s optimization 
problem (A11) can be written as: 
−
12� (𝐼𝑆 + 𝜇𝑗𝑌)𝐶𝑀′𝑚𝑗=1 = 1.     (𝐴12) 
Comparative statics on (A12) yields: 
𝜕𝑡
𝜕𝜇𝑗
= 𝑌𝐶𝑀′2𝜕2𝜋�𝑀/𝜕𝑡2 > 0.            (𝐴13) 
Consumer welfare in a market is measured by 𝑉(𝑞, 𝐼) = 𝑈(𝐼 − 𝑞𝐼𝑆(𝑞), 𝐼𝑆(𝑞)).  Using the 
envelope theorem, I derive 
𝜕𝑉
𝜕𝑡
= 𝜕𝑉
𝜕𝑞
𝜕𝑞
𝜕𝐶𝑀
𝐶𝑀
′ (𝑡) = − 𝜕𝑈
𝜕𝑥0
𝐼𝑆𝑆′𝐶𝑀
′ (𝑡)(𝑞 − 𝐶𝑀 − 𝐶)𝑆′′ + 2𝑆′ > 0.   (𝐴14) 
Total welfare in a market is obtained by setting 𝐼 = 𝐼0 + (𝑚Π∗ − 𝑡) 𝑚⁄  in V(q, I).  Using (A12) 
  
43 
and (A14), I obtain:   
𝜕𝑊
𝜕𝑡
= 𝐶𝑀′ (𝑡) 𝜕𝑈𝜕𝑥0 � 𝐼𝑆𝑆′(𝑞 − 𝐶𝑀 − 𝐶)𝑆′′ + 2𝑆′ + 𝑚𝐼𝑆 − ∑ 𝜇𝑖𝑌𝑚𝑖=12𝑚 � > 0.    (𝐴15) 
The second term in the square brackets of (A15) is positive because 𝐼𝑆(𝑞) > 𝜇𝑖𝑌 in every 
market.  From (A13)–(A15), I conclude 𝜕𝑉 𝜕𝜇𝑗 > 0⁄  and 𝜕𝑊 𝜕𝜇𝑗 > 0⁄ .  QED   
Proof of Proposition 6: From (7) and (36), I conclude that 𝜕𝑡 𝜕𝛾𝑗⁄ < 0.  The results on consumer 
and social welfare are proved in the same way as in the proof of Proposition 5.   QED 
Proof of Proposition 7: From (37), I find 𝜕2𝜋�𝑅𝐶𝑑 𝜕𝑡𝜕𝜆⁄ = 0.  Then (8) implies that λ has no 
impact of the supplier’s choice of t.  QED 
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Tables 
 
Table 1: Impact of Increased Buyer Power on Incentives to Innovate 
             Channel of Buyer Power 
Type of  
Innovation 
Supplier’s 
Bargaining Position 
Retailer’s 
Bargaining Power 
Retailer’s Bargaining 
Position 
 
Product Innovation 
Positive if demand 
elasticity is not too 
large 
Positive if demand 
elasticity is not too 
large  
Negative 
 
Process Innovation 
 
Negative 
 
Negative 
 
No Impact 
   
Table 2. Impact of Increased Buyer Power on Supplier’s Marginal Gains from Innovation 
            Channel of       
                        Buyer Power 
Type of 
Innovation 
Supplier’s Bargaining 
Position 
Retailer’s Bargaining 
Power 
Retailer’s Bargaining 
Position 
Product Innovation ∂2𝜋𝑀
𝑗𝑑 ∂𝛽𝑗 ∂𝑘� > 0 if 
demand elasticity is 
not too large  
∂2π𝑀 ∂𝛽
𝑗 ∂𝑘⁄ > 0 if 
demand elasticity is 
not too large 
∂2𝜋𝑅
𝑗𝑑 ∂𝛽𝑗 ∂𝑘 > 0�  
Process Innovation ∂2𝜋𝑀
𝑗𝑑 ∂𝛽𝑗 ∂𝑘� < 0 ∂2π𝑀 ∂𝛽𝑗 ∂𝑘⁄ < 0 ∂2𝜋𝑅𝑗𝑑 ∂𝛽𝑗 ∂𝑘 = 0�  
 
 
